

*Abstract:* In a famous passage from the Blue Book, Wittgenstein claims that there are two uses of 'I': besides the 'use as object', there is also the 'use as subject'. Sidney Shoemaker (1968) ascribes to Wittgenstein a discriminating criterion in terms of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM), and the tradition has followed him in this interpretation (see, for example, Prosser and Recanati 2012). I will first argue that the IEM-criterion is unable to distinguish the two uses of 'I' and then introduce another criterion which the tradition largely ignores, although it is hinted at in the very same passage from the Blue Book. According to this second criterion, the subject-use of 'I' is reserved for such self-ascriptions of mental states that are not autobiographical assertions at all, but expressions of these mental states. I will therefore sketch a theory of Wittgenstein's psychological expressivism and show its relevance for the notion of a subject use of 'I'. I will conclude with a discussion of some semantical and metaphysical consequences of this view.